6. Contract Reference

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Live testnet addresses across every supported chain. Authoritative source: webapp/src/config/chains.ts (this document is a snapshot).

Last updated and verified: 2026-06-05. §6.1-6.6 (EVM chains + yield) verified against the webapp config files, all addresses match. §6.8 (Solana Devnet): Phase B is complete; C-lite trust-minimized recipient-claim path verified end-to-end on Devnet (2026-05-20), exposed in the dApp as of 2026-06-05 via the V1 C-lite message shape, with the V2 atomic path preserved in code (svmCcip.ts buildBridgeMessageV2) for when Chainlink unblocks the offramp heap-OOM. §6.10 (Account Abstraction contracts) added 2026-05-17.

This document is the canonical contract registry. Per CLAUDE.md invariant 5, any contract added, removed, redeployed, or deprecated on any chain is reflected here in the same commit.

6.1 Sepolia (chainId 11155111)

Contract Address
MBT (RWA token) 0x044951AB857C7e23b5570D4ca11466ACACF861A8
BurnMintTokenPool 0x53d88a3Fe9480767bE210CbC2e2b3E14145D087d
PolicyEngine 0xd4b9F980f09f0871C753a7d558B5c500DA1617a3
AllowPolicy 0x7858b6e699c381583A8A820F52AF051197B3DCD1
PausePolicy 0x2038964Aea77Aa4A7cfB6a8A769e83FD119e634A
PoR Reserve Feed 0xf88882929AA3ABcDf6A9B976AA33B4158C918c1C

CCIP Router: 0x0BF3dE8c5D3e8A2B34D2BEeB17ABfCeBaf363A59 (Chainlink-hosted) LINK token: 0x779877A7B0D9E8603169DdbD7836e478b4624789

6.2 Polygon Amoy (chainId 80002)

Contract Address
MBT (RWA token) 0x71A8e443f223cFe59498968758dB49F2D114dCE2
BurnMintTokenPool 0x48dB3f62B6c7328Fb742B4799654136794dBE2B4
PolicyEngine 0xfefA774dB9A52c72EC8f0621046836CbA63d2BA6
AllowPolicy 0x5fe9d900945b60B3BEcEDe4382BEd2653EC99D40
PausePolicy 0x8c57Abe7Cf1330346EB760EDaEE380A66D3f42f7
LockVault (CRE source for Sonic) 0x5D273AAE0547FD33c0C5247487a160cd26f38FE4
MockUSDC 0xce8c237c6b8bf91df589ea740d4d65cbb75f7ddd

CCIP Router: 0x9C32fCB86BF0f4a1A8921a9Fe46de3198bb884B2 LINK token: 0x0Fd9e8d3aF1aaee056EB9e802c3A762a667b1904

6.3 Plume Testnet (chainId 98867)

Contract Address
MBT (RWA token) 0x43cc10a0bbeb70d8efcb45714e0e0f4c49500c75
BurnMintTokenPool 0x8c57abe7cf1330346eb760edaee380a66d3f42f7
PolicyEngine 0x045a3c91e4742aaeb9b3e0e5d87a0b94b801c6d3
AllowPolicy 0x2aedDb48a3b6028244ed31C0fdDEB2B72Fce3bE1
PausePolicy 0x5d273aae0547fd33c0c5247487a160cd26f38fe4

CCIP Router: 0x5e5Fd4720E1CE826138D043aF578D69f48af502F LINK token: 0xB97e3665AEAF96BDD6b300B2e0C93C662104A068

Plume’s inbound CCIP from Sepolia is live as of 2026-05-14 after Chainlink raised the per-token gas overhead. End-to-end verification: deployer received 10 MBT on Plume via tx 0x6787e45ffbcf6e3dc2c872e015c4695f02f861a3243caecce3cf8c7f24b6cfe7 and 0x6d07538f367658d1b9674b2c4eb19884b20d2fca92976d95d4c93d1704fd1e1b.

6.4 Astar Shibuya (chainId 81) - dApp lane currently hidden

Contract Address
MBT (RWA token) 0xf08a207bb7d0198356ed4fffd555ee7129e2b8f5
BurnMintTokenPool 0x1febe4cf83c444b012dcee7bbce145fc66c1b06d
PolicyEngine 0xb48b0ed177647723ce6e4c306d62b1037bc44967
ComplianceCheck (combined Allow + Pause) 0xce8c237c6b8bf91df589ea740d4d65cbb75f7ddd

CCIP Router: 0x22aE550d87eBf775E0c1fDc8881121c8A51F5903 LINK token: 0xe74037112db8807B3B4B3895F5790e5bc1866a29

Shibuya contracts remain deployed but the dApp lane is hidden as of 2026-05-14. Sepolia <-> Shibuya CCIP lane shows zero OffRamp activity over a 33h window (v1.5 OffRamp 0x4E773089d04E2CA777BFbC6f15150A3e542ABC7a and v1.2 OffRamp 0xF389104dFaD66cED6B77b879FF76b572a8cC3590 both quiet). Awaiting Chainlink confirmation of lane status (active / decommissioned / migrating to v1.6).

6.5 Sonic Testnet (chainId 14601) — non-CCIP, CRE-bridged

Contract Address
WrappedMBT v2 (compliance-gated) 0x670c3a58435cc13e9edA059F4093F31CedEEF7F3
CREBridgeConsumer v2 0xA56efb5A85A2C9c2e07478Ce257CEdEcEE9cA7f6
KeystoneForwarder (Chainlink-hosted) 0x98B8335d29Aca40840Ed8426dA1A0aAa8677d8D1
Nova Finance LendingVault v2 (wMBT v2 collateral) 0x49f1aa7C252183E79D4944c54698a335Ed65C150
TestUSDC (Nova vault liquidity + yield currency) 0x43CC10a0bbEb70d8EFCb45714e0e0F4C49500c75
YieldIssuer 0x905142640A63B582E954C14e7Ed98a49E165D9Ef
YT-MBT token 0x02670162368541ae0098C5C6b76B60Ee0DD749Cf
YTMarket 0xFf586b23d45B4BE1677f19c1589A60321631069e

WrappedMBT v2 has built-in allowlist + pause (no separate AllowPolicy contract). Admin functions: allowAddress, disallowAddress, allowAddresses, setPaused, setMinter, addressAllowed(view).

v1 wMBT at 0x9139FbB66e770EB3baBCbC7fD59Ef690bCfA7784 is deprecated — pre-ACE compliance migration. 14 wMBT v1 tokens are stranded in test wallets; the dApp no longer reads from this contract.

6.6 Yield-stripping deployments (per chain)

YieldIssuer + YT token + YTMarket addresses for each chain that runs the yield product:

Sepolia

Superseded by the 2026-06-16 snapshot redeploy (do not import): the 2026-06-03 compliance-fix Sepolia stack (YieldIssuer 0x34b8822b..., YT 0x7f939bc5..., YTMarket 0xa25cC783...); and before it, the pre-2026-06-03-fix stack (plain ERC-20 YT, non-KYC wallets could buy through YTMarket; see docs/design/yt-mbt-compliance-fix.md): YieldIssuer 0x207bba4c..., YT 0x4142f0D3..., YTMarket 0xec6ed8b7....

Old/deprecated Sepolia yield deployments (built on an orphaned MockUSDC, no longer in use): YieldIssuer 0x6c1f0bf4…, YT 0xeC7F0BbD…, YTMarket 0x65fb4431…. Do not import these.

Amoy

Superseded by the 2026-06-16 snapshot redeploy (do not import): the 2026-06-04 compliance-fix Amoy stack (YieldIssuer 0x62BD210F..., YT 0xC4dE838d..., YTMarket 0xa701147b...); and before it, the pre-2026-06-03-fix stack (plain ERC-20 YT): YieldIssuer 0x0fb97310..., YT 0x42495e16..., YTMarket 0xf08a2070....

Plume

Superseded by the 2026-06-16 snapshot redeploy (do not import): the 2026-06-04 compliance-fix Plume stack (YieldIssuer 0xBe010733..., YT 0x6eB381e9..., YTMarket 0x6c1F0bF4...); and before it, the pre-2026-06-03-fix stack (plain ERC-20 YT): YieldIssuer 0xf3186574..., YT 0x470A4f73..., YTMarket 0xfefa774d....

Sonic Testnet (deployed 2026-05-06 — first non-CCIP chain with full yield product)

Superseded by the 2026-06-16 snapshot redeploy (do not import): the 2026-06-04 compliance-fix Sonic stack (YieldIssuer 0xe43355DF..., YT 0x73362F49..., YTMarket 0x3c407079...); and before it, the pre-2026-06-03-fix stack (plain ERC-20 YT): YieldIssuer 0xc38e9d12..., YT 0x0954Ca93..., YTMarket 0x0ae06a1a....

6.7 Lending vaults

Chain Provider LendingVault USDC
Sepolia Meridian Lending (see webapp/src/config/defi.ts) (see same file)
Amoy Atlas Capital    
Sonic Nova Finance    
Plume Plumage Finance    

Authoritative source: webapp/src/config/defi.ts.

6.8 Solana Devnet — non-EVM (Category B), Phase A + Phase B

Contract Address
mbt-allowlist-hook program 7AV99KFhxpn1XpkkRAaW5peSZxqrDWFTA3JrYjDXGqrs
Wrapped-MBT mint (SPL Token-2022) ENndzpMJtnMigJpvJFiB2JrdZH5wMvtcmYFoTM7Tadiz
Allowlist config PDA 75BvNn9FXbJcQts7piRRChcsDgA2sxBSC4np5jzhrL1p
ExtraAccountMetaList PDA 3C39RWz9R8wnanjVtqL1oXfMBxhd4625NEPuyjEYCiyp
mbt-bridge-delivery program AcapDYPqWuZP64E3dA2mtFf8CG9GLbvJd1fQHhTym45Y
Escrow config PDA BoRq3UKuQznsT4VBCSEeg7CcBhoXg8MKGnxatrvhZxz
Escrow authority PDA 3ZsLonSFLnJ54JhJ1T6kGVBaoPU72S2p8eP1FnGnyw6R
Escrow token account (holds inbound wrapped-MBT) C4yjgA7v594fBBXsu3LtHxxvGcET9vmSf3xNDW74hgXM

Chainlink CCIP CCT pool (wrapped-MBT registered as a Cross-Chain Token):

Contract Address
CCIP BurnMint token-pool program (canonical, Chainlink-operated) 41FGToCmdaWa1dgZLKFAjvmx6e6AjVTX7SVRibvsMGVB
CCIP Router (Devnet, Chainlink-operated) Ccip842gzYHhvdDkSyi2YVCoAWPbYJoApMFzSxQroE9C
Pool config / state PDA (wrapped-MBT) A5gue4GMvcuuFuHMqkuKZDpca8WMaPnTF9GioM3crdfh
Pool signer PDA 9DZfW6BvouJY6cbPRL8v9VF5pubySYeBUbTR9QSHN6Ky
Pool token account Z1Hsea5QmUBSx71241SZqKcFHV7Xt42kyZkTvbUMzZF
Address Lookup Table (pool ALT) RQzEV89dLtYMjmPzXW6k8FBcYKXg4FPhcCWZi2dYhwd
Sepolia-lane chain-config PDA 7zHNGtk9uAhWDQ9GT2kCfprkvSSbNMi6cLUh6K6GHLfN

mbt-allowlist-hook is the Solana-native equivalent of the EVM ACE AllowPolicy: an SPL Token-2022 transfer-hook that rejects a wrapped-MBT transfer unless the recipient is allowlisted. Upgrade + allowlist authority: the Devnet deployer Bx4vCP6REyxF9ESme9qvm6Vj8nXCzKbPdi39udrHsLAe.

mbt-bridge-delivery (Phase B) is the inbound-bridge compliance gate. SPL Token-2022 transfer hooks do not fire on mint_to, so a stock Chainlink CCIP burn-and-mint pool minting straight to a recipient would bypass the allowlist. Instead the pool mints inbound wrapped MBT into the program-owned escrow token account above, and the program’s deliver step releases it to the final recipient through a real Token-2022 transfer, which triggers mbt-allowlist-hook and enforces the allowlist on inbound bridge deliveries. Escrow admin + keeper: the Devnet deployer Bx4vCP6REyxF9ESme9qvm6Vj8nXCzKbPdi39udrHsLAe.

The wrapped-MBT mint is registered as a CCIP Cross-Chain Token, and the Sepolia ↔ Solana Devnet lane is wired on both sides. Solana side: the BurnMint pool config is initialized in Chainlink’s canonical Devnet pool program, the Sepolia remote chain is configured (chain-config PDA above, Sepolia pool + token registered, rate limits disabled), the pool ALT is registered with the Token Admin Registry, and the Devnet deployer is the registry administrator. EVM side: the Sepolia MBT pool 0x53d88a3Fe9480767bE210CbC2e2b3E14145D087d has Solana Devnet added as a remote chain (applyChainUpdates, tx 0xa01d4eaa4963cdea3a897c3762408ec392ef04419654b3feca437095eaa2f701), registering the Solana pool state PDA as the remote pool and the wrapped-MBT mint as the remote token. The wrapped-MBT mint authority has been transferred to the pool signer PDA 9DZfW6BvouJY6cbPRL8v9VF5pubySYeBUbTR9QSHN6Ky, so inbound CCIP deliveries mint wrapped MBT and nothing else can.

Phase B is complete and verified end-to-end (2026-05-19): 10 MBT bridged Sepolia → Solana Devnet (CCIP message 0x43ef48117a07b43dd1e4773f509af54971b7a55d427565c61abd23f985897eea), minted into the escrow, then deliver released 6 to an allowlisted recipient (succeeded, through the transfer hook) and a delivery to a non-allowlisted recipient was rejected by the hook (NotAllowlisted), leaving those tokens parked in escrow. Compliance is enforced on inbound bridge deliveries. Solana is exposed in the dApp at https://rwa-testnet.onchainbridges.com via the V1 C-lite path as of 2026-06-05 (gated by VITE_SOLANA_ENABLED=true, dApp component SolanaBridgePanel.tsx). The dApp uses buildBridgeMessage (V1 C-lite) with compute_units = 0 to satisfy the FeeQuoter’s hardened SVM destination address validation that rejects non-zero gasLimit with a zero receiver. The V2 atomic helpers (buildBridgeMessageV2, encodeSvmExtraArgsV2) stay in the codebase so the dApp can flip back to atomic delivery as soon as the Chainlink offramp update ships.

C-lite trust-minimized recipient-claim path verified (2026-05-20): the keeper-free v2 design (ccip_receive does atomic delivery) awaits a Chainlink Solana offramp update. The C-lite interim path was added to the deployed program: PendingDelivery PDA (seeded by CCIP message id), record_pending_delivery (admin-only, the interim writer), and claim (permissionless caller; the recipient signs to pull their tokens out of escrow through the hook). End-to-end on Devnet: 10 MBT bridged via the v1-style starter-kit send (CCIP message 0x8ebadc70639f2b429b87354777f4d029bd76ef300bd12282855fbfe5c8903aa8), pool minted into escrow, admin recorded the pending delivery, recipient self-signed claim to receive 10 wrapped MBT through the compliance hook (escrow 14 → 4, recipient 6 → 16, PDA closed, rent refunded). The same claim flow will be used once the Chainlink offramp update ships; only the recorder changes. Solana is exposed in the dApp at https://rwa-testnet.onchainbridges.com via the V1 C-lite path as of 2026-06-05 (gated by VITE_SOLANA_ENABLED=true, dApp component SolanaBridgePanel.tsx). The dApp uses buildBridgeMessage (V1 C-lite) with compute_units = 0 to satisfy the FeeQuoter’s hardened SVM destination address validation that rejects non-zero gasLimit with a zero receiver. The V2 atomic helpers (buildBridgeMessageV2, encodeSvmExtraArgsV2) stay in the codebase so the dApp can flip back to atomic delivery as soon as the Chainlink offramp update ships.

6.9 Address book — quick reference

If you’re integrating, the three addresses you’ll hit most:

6.10 Account Abstraction (AA) contracts

AA Phase 2 (paying source-chain gas, and in v2 the CCIP LINK fee, in TLPT) is deployed on testnet but not yet enabled in the dApp — the “Gas mode” toggle is hidden behind VITE_AA_V2_ENABLED until the single-fee abstraction is complete (CLAUDE.md invariant 4). These contracts are live on-chain but are not yet a user-facing surface.

Authoritative source: webapp/src/config/aa.ts. Astar Shibuya is excluded (Pimlico does not support it).

Canonical — identical on every chain:

Per chain: TLPTPaymaster v1 (TLPT covers source-chain gas only; live since 2026-04-27) and v2.1 (TLPT covers gas + CCIP LINK fees; deployed 2026-05-10), the TLPT fee token, and the TLPTFaucet.

Sepolia

Polygon Amoy

Soneium Minato

Sonic Testnet

Plume Testnet

v2.0 paymasters (deployed 2026-05-09) are superseded by v2.1 and remain on chain; their addresses are in the aa.ts comments. Minato and Sonic currently share a TLPTFaucet address (0xbf92…a02f) — a deterministic-deployment coincidence, they are independent contracts on separate chains.

6.11 Stacks Testnet4: non-EVM (Category C, non-CCIP), Phase A

Stacks is a Bitcoin L2 with Clarity smart contracts, reached without CCIP (Category C). Phase A (the token + native compliance) is deployed; the bridge transport (Phase B) is not built yet. RPC: https://api.testnet.hiro.so. Deployed 2026-06-13 via the Stacks Explorer “Write & Deploy” sandbox with a Leather wallet (no CLI key). Source + tests live in the OnchainBridges-Stacks worktree under clarity/.

Contract Address
stx-mbt (SIP-010 wrapped MBT: compliance + bridge mint/burn) ST1RSK6GEJ4GP8QC1QNN91J1KW014FBZCMTAQDQZW.stx-mbt
sip-010-trait (local SIP-010 trait) ST1RSK6GEJ4GP8QC1QNN91J1KW014FBZCMTAQDQZW.sip-010-trait

Deployer / owner / relayer / compliance-admin (genesis, all the same principal until reassigned): ST1RSK6GEJ4GP8QC1QNN91J1KW014FBZCMTAQDQZW. Stacks addresses use canonical c32check (not EIP-55).

stx-mbt is the Stacks-native equivalent of the EVM ACE AllowPolicy: an allowlist + pause guard (assert-compliant) runs at the top of every value-moving function (transfer both sides, bridge-mint, bridge-burn), since Clarity has no inheritance. Burns are recorded as queryable state (the burns map + get-burn read-only getter), so the planned return-path 2-of-3 quorum can read each burn via the bare-node /v2/contracts/call-read RPC on independent stacks-core nodes rather than Hiro’s /extended/* events indexer.

Status: deployed + verified live (name / symbol / decimals 18 / supply 0 / roles / paused=false all read back correct via call-read). NOT post-deploy-configured (relayer still = deployer, allowlist empty) and NOT exposed in the dApp. Per policy_non_ccip_chain_compliance.md, Stacks ships in the UI only after the compliance stack is wired end-to-end through the bridge and pre-demo-check.ts is green for it. UNAUDITED, demo-grade. Charter: docs/handoffs/STACKS-KICKOFF-2026-06-13.md.

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